en avoir fini avec cet empire du jugement qui fut en somme presque toute la philosophie

pharmakeus

Member
English - USA
Je traduis cet essai "Devant la loi" et j'ai besoin d'aider avec la phrase certaine: "On pouvait donc croire, si cette époque a fait époque, et époque du jugement, en avoir fini avec cet empire du jugement qui fut en somme presque toute la philosophie."

J'ai traduit le phrase comme: "Therefore, one was able to believe, when this time [époque] made time—and time of judgment—of having been through with this empire of judgment that was in sum nearly all of philosophy."

Merci beaucoup!
 
  • janpol

    Senior Member
    France - français
    une phrase d'une grande limpidité !
    ta traduction semble très fidèle sauf pour "si" = "when" (?)...
     

    pharmakeus

    Member
    English - USA
    It makes no sense with "if"--this is why I ask for help. I also don't understand the difference in tenses. In English you can't mix present and past in such a way.
     

    pharmakeus

    Member
    English - USA
    The first hypothesis—and I would tell the first prejudice if I were to decide on no longer pronouncing this word furthermore—the first hypothesis is I myself. So I wanted to introduce myself for some seconds, to appear once more before you, who are here both the law and the doorkeepers [les gardiens de la loi—TN: this is the French translation of Türhüter by Alexandre Vialatte and Marthe Robert, but literally this would be guardians of the lawle porteur forms more to the structure of doorkeeper, porter or bearer, as it appears earlier in “Devant la loi”—however, I believe Türhüter comes from tür-hüter, such as door-guard, rather than a porter, with an emphasis on the guard and an acceptance of door as law—but above all the question of this authority should be kept from us, as we stay on our guard]. To present myself to you as a lone man before the law, not to ask or tell who I am, not to provoke a judgment in you while recounting a story, but rather to explicate myself on the subject of my relationship with judgment in general, and with Lyotard of course. Yet, in preparing myself for this session [séance], during most of a year, I awoke from a deaf stubbornness with which, always, I held at a distance this theme—and I tell you this theme now—of the judgment. For, at the very foundation [au fond], one could consider all discourse on differance, on undecidability, etc., as devices in store for judgment in all forms (predicatives, prescriptives, always decisives). It will be easy to show that, under this apparent store, a judgment is installed in the return place or the return fact, commanding the scene which seems absent with a denigrated tyranny still more intractable. Nevertheless, in its same appearance, this manifestation—in which I take part, in which I have my part—this manifestation that would consist in dealing with the question of judgment no more as the being given, obligatory [n’étant plus de mise], but as unpresentable in sum, one could still consider significant. Not only as regards any particular process, if one can say that, of the judgment itself, let us say at least of instructions carried out against the judgment, but also as regards the time [l’époque]. And this was a marked time: 1) by a phenomenology (which was one of my first interests in common with Lyotard—I started my readings with Husserl and understood him for the first time in 1963 at a collegiate conference on philosophy and thereafter over a number of other times on the constitution of things, on the hyle, etc.), that-is-to-say, by an epoché [époché], as suspension of the thesis of existence that often takes, not to say always, the form of judgment; the de-sedimentation of the predicative layer of experience, the genealogy of the judgment during the return to the antepredicative basis [assise]of perception; 2) by a Heideggerian meditation which all paths pass through a hidden truth to its judicative form; the truth as adaequatio is essentially bound to the judgment, to the proposition, that-is-to-say founded on an unveiling neither judicative, nor prejudicative, an other truth—the alētheia that is not bound to judgment. It is clearly enounced [énoncé] from Sein und Zeit (“The concept of logos,” pg. 32); and 3) by a psychoanalytic moving, notably around Verneinung, which came to make less silly [déniaiser] all possible assurances in non-paradoxical interpretations of judging discourse.


    Therefore, one was able to believe, when this time [époque] made time—and time of judgment—of having been through with this empire of judgment that was in sum nearly all of philosophy. And yet the singularity today most manifest in Jean-François Lyotard, the paradox of his signature, that is of having lived this era [époque] in all its places and being able to have deserted them; and, for a site that was solely his, of having launched against the era [époque] what I will not only call a formidable accusation but a definite categorical that I also understand as its own laughter. He tells us: you are not through, we are never through with the judgment. Your time [époque], it is also a crisis—and your bracketing [époquè] (Husserlian or Heideggerian)—still looks after [garde encore] something of an enormous prejudgment under the form, the guise [sous la forme] of a paradoxical denegation regarding the judgment itself. We need to review all this, to start again for example from another implementation of psychoanalysis (non-Lacanian) from denegation, from récit, from paradox, from a new practice. Etc.
     

    janpol

    Senior Member
    France - français
    "On pouvait donc croire, si cette époque a fait époque, et époque du jugement, en avoir fini avec cet empire du jugement qui fut en somme presque toute la philosophie."
    "si" a un sens : dans le cas où / dans l'hypothèse où / en supposant que / en admettant que...
    Cette époque a fait époque = ce terme semble avoir pour l'auteur un sens particulier et important = une entité, une unité, un tout sur le plan temporel. On peut penser que, dans l'esprit de l'auteur, une période donnée doit satisfaire à certains critères précis pour mériter le nom de "période", alors, il est surprenant qu'il emploie le même mot : cette époque fait époque (devient une époque / mérite d'être appelée "époque") car il ne peut pas avoir pour a priori qu'il s'agit bien de ce qu'il appelle "époque" : on attendrait plutôt "dans le cas où cette période a été une époque et une "époque du jugement", on a pu croire qu'on en avait fini avec l'empire / la dictature du jugement ......"
    les temps ? il n'est pas logique qu'à une époque qui se caractérise par la suprématie du jugement on ait pu croire à la fin de cette suprématie... alors, on peut imaginer que l'on pouvait croire dans le passé mais après cette période dont il est question (s'il s'agit bien de ce que l'auteur appelle période) qu'on en avait fini avec l'empire du jugement... When" introduirait une idée de simultanéité qui me semble absente ici...
    Bon, tout cela est bien compliqué...
     
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